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SECURITIES-Purchaser of Outstanding Shares of
Same Class as Registered Issue Cannot Bring
Snit Under Section 11 (a) of Securities Act
--Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.*
Pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933,1 defendantseller filed a registration statement covering a large issue of debentures and the common stock issuable upon their conversion.2
Through a series of purchases on the open market beginning four
months after this filing, plaintiff acquired a large amount of defendant's outstanding common stock. Subsequently, the market value
of the common stock dropped and plaintiff sustained a considerable
loss on its investment. Although it conceded that it had not purchased any of the shares converted from the registered issue of
debentures, plaintiff instituted a suit for damages3 claiming, inter
alia, that alleged material misstatements in the registration statement gave it a right to recover under section 11 of the Securities
Act, 4 which provides in relevant part that:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact
or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person
acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such
acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, ... sue ...."
[Emphasis added.]

On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed plaintiff's claim. The use of the words "such security" in section ll(a) of
• 257 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (hereinafter referred to as principal case].
I. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964). Section 5, 68 Stat. 684
(1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964), makes it unlawful to issue securities through the mails
or interstate commerce unless a registration statement is in effect, except as a particular
issue or transaction might be exempt from registration by § 3, 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964), or § 4, 78 Stat. 580 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964).
Section 7, 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964), deals with the information required
in the registration statement.
2. The registration statement covered an issue of $25,634,400 of debentures as well
as any common stock which would be converted therefrom. At the time the present suit
was instituted, only 209 shares of common stock had been converted from the debentures.
3. l3etween May 2, 1961, and August 6, 1962, the plaintiff acquired over 30,000
shares of the outstanding common stock at a purchase price of over $1,600,000. The
alleged loss in value was over $1,000,000.
4. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). The claim under § 11 was
the first count of a 39-count complaint; trial on the other counts is still pending. The
other claims were made under the 1933 Act §§ 12, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1964); 17, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964); the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9, 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964); lO(b),
48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); 15, 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 780 (1964); 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964); and the
common law.
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the Securities Act limits the applicability of that section to securities
which are, in fact, issued under the registration statement: the section does not cover unregistered securities even if they are of the
same class.
The court in the principal case conceded that, as a matter of economic reality, the prospectus (which contained the alleged misstatement) affects, because of its wide circulation, the value of the shares
outstanding at the time it is distributed, as well as that of the new
issue which is the subject of the registration statement. Indeed, financial institutions, market experts, brokers, and dealers digest and
analyze the prospectus, and their opinions inevitably affect market
values of all outstanding stock. 6 However, in light of the act's legislative history, its general scheme of regulation, and the language
contained in its other provisions, the court was compelled to deny
the plaintiff's cause of action.
The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to regulate the marketing
of specific issues of securities. It requires comprehensive registration
in order to assure a complete, honest, and competent disclosure of
the nature and value of securities being offered to the public. The
act, however, was not intended to regulate the trading of outstanding securities.6 When the House bill which was to become the 1933
Act was presented to Congress in substantially its final form, the
scope of its civil liability provisions was described as entitling
5. "These arguments have the sound ring of economic reality but unfortunately
they merely point up the problems involved in the present scheme of statutory
regulation." Principal case at 881. There can be no dispute that the information appearing in the registration statement may have a profound economic effect on holders of
all outstanding securities. For a judicial recognition of this fact, cf. Columbia Gen.
Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 265 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1959), affirming the SEC's issuance of a stop
order against the effectiveness of a misleading registration statement over the issuer's
contention that such order could not issue if the registrant desired to withdraw the
statement voluntarily since such withdrawal was of no concern to anyone other than
the registrant.
6. In the words of James M. Landis, one of the draftsmen of the House bill, who
later served as SEC chairman, "throughout, its patent concern was primarily with the
flow of securities from the issuer through underwriters to the public rather than with
the subsequent buying and selling of the securities by the public." Landis, The
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 36 (1959).
Regulation of trading in outstanding securities was one of the basic purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Generally, the 1934 Act contemplates continuous
registration of an entire class of outstanding stock through periodic filing of reports
under § 12, 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964), and § 13, 48 Stat.
894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964). The express civil liabilities which the
1934 Act creates generally run only against the issuer and persons controlling the
issuing corporation and involve very difficult matters of proof. Therefore, a buyer in
the present plaintiff's shoes has a much less effective remedy under the 1934 Act than
he would have under the 1933 Act if the court in the principal case had upheld his
claim. For an excellent analysis and discussion of the interrelationship of the 1933 and
1934 Acts and their frequently overlapping and inconsistent disclosure requirements,
see Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966), which also
contains sweeping proposals for a more coordinated system of federal securities regulation which would incorporate the more effective aspects of both Acts.
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". . . the buyer of registered securities sold upon a registration statement including an untrue statement or omission of material fact, to
sue . . . .'' 7 Since its enactment, commentators have assumed that,
in view of the act's restrictive purpose, its remedial provisions are
to be interpreted narrowly. 8
Moreover, the basic structure of the act9 leaves little doubt that
Congress intended to limit strictly the civil liability which flows
from non-compliance with its provisions. Procedural obstacles have
been placed in the paths of would-be plaintiffs so as to limit the potentially great liability which might otherwise be incurred. Indeed,
the possibility that the court would require the plaintiff to undertake the cost of the suit coupled with the generally heavy litigation
expense involved therein and a short statute of limitations applicable to section 11 actions tend to discourage litigation of even substantively sound claims.10 These obstacles are evidence of the fact
that the primary purpose underlying the imposition of liability
7. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
The bill affects only new offerings of securities sold through the use of the mails
or of instrumentalities of interstate or foreign transportation or communication.
It does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities unless such redistribution
takes on the characteristics of a new offering by reason of the control of the issuer
possessed by those responsible for the offering.
Id. at 5. (Emphasis added.)
8. E.g., 3 Loss, SECURITIES R.EcuLATION 1731 n.160 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss)
("Presumably, however, the open-market buyer must be able to trace his particular
securities to the registration statement when it covered additional securities of an
outstanding class''); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1340, 1341, 1355-74; Flanagin, The Federal
Securities Act and the Locked-in Stockholder, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1141 (1965);
Painter, Civil Liabilities and Administrative Sanctions Under the Securities Act of
1933, 34 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 185 (1966); Schulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933); Comment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Documents Filed Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J. 456 (1935).
9. For summaries of the scope of the 1933 Act, see, e.g., Douglas &: Bates, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Halleran &: Calderwood, Effect
of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 86 (1959); Reinoehl, Basic Pattern and Coverage of the 1933 Act, 34 U. Mo. KAN.
CITY L. REv. 172 (1966); and authorities cited note 8 supra.
10. Section ll(e) gives the coun the authority to require, at its discretion, an undertaking for the costs of the suit, including attorney's fees. A summary or direced judgment may be the ground for a similar assessment of costs, should the court believe the
suit to have been without merit. Generally, the costs incurred in obtaining the necessary
matters of proof are extremely heavy, and there is a general tendency to avoid throwing
good money after bad when an investment loss has been incurred. Cf. Fox v. Glickman
Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (Transfer Binder 1964-1966) 1J 91682 (S.D.N.Y. May. 3,
1966); Dabny v. Allegheny Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Montague v. Electronic
Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Section 13, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964), provides that no
action may be maintained under either §§ II or 12 unless it is brought within one
year after the discovery of the untrue statement or omission, and in no case more
than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public. See, e.g., Shonts
v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D.
707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); M. J. Hall &: Co. v. Johnson, 92 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
But see Escott v. Barchriss Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
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under the 1933 Act is to produce an in terrorem or deterrent effect.11
Since the act is not primarily concerned with recovery, there is no
apparent reason for reading section 11 so as to provide compensation
to anyone who may have suffered a loss which is traceable to the
seller's misrepresentation. The court in the principal case admitted
that to give a right of recovery to only those purchasers who fortuitously acquired shares from a particular registered issue while
denying that same right to those who happened to buy completely
fungible but unregistered shares on the open market is indeed an
arbitrary distinction when viewed from the standpoint of compensation for market losses due to false registration; a distortion of the
financial condition of the defendant-seller inflates the market value
of its stock and the later, inevitable drop in price results in a loss to
anyone holding that stock, regardless of whether it is stock which
happened to be the subject of the registration statement alleged to
have precipitated the market decline. Nevertheless, and in spite of
the appeal to one's sense of equity of a right to compensation for
anyone holding adversely affected shares, the arbitrary limits on the
remedy provided in section 11 may be justified if the paramount
purpose of the provisions is penal rather than compensatory.12 And,
the penal nature of the provision is demonstrated by the fact, dis11. See, e.g., Note, 72 YALE L.J. 406, 410 (1962), which asserts that insurance agree•
ments indemnifying underwriters run counter to the 1933 Act's basic policy of holding
great personal liability over the heads of those responsible for the truthfulness and
competence of the registration statement. Shulman, supra note 8, states that:
It is not the object of the Act simply to provide a legal remedy for the investor
who has bought securities upon a false representation, to compensate him for a
loss incurred. Even the provisions for civil liability are calculated to be largely
preventive rather than redressive.
Id. at 227; cf. Wogahn v. Stevens, 236 Wis. 122, 294 N.W. 503 (1940), characterizing § 11
as penal rather than remedial in nature, and therefore holding that the cause of action
which it creates is unassignable.
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). This
case demonstrates that the arbitrary nature of a remedy is irrelevant where the
underlying rationale for the providing of the remedy is, in the first instance, to
effect a penal sanction. The SEC complaint demanded relief in the form of an
order compelling the insider defendants to offer recission and/or restitution to
the person or persons from whom each of these defendants purchased stock and
options or calls to purchase the company's stock during the period in which the
defendants had information as to the value of the stock, which information had
not yet been made public. From the standpoint of granting relief for investment
injuries, the SEC proposal is clearly arbitrary; the very limited class of sellers who
would be permitted to recover in such a situation had wholly personal reasons for
deciding to sell their Texas Gulf holdings when they did. The mere fortuity that their
stock was purchased by one of the defendant-insiders would not seem to give them
a more equitable claim than that of any of the other Texas Gulf shareholders who
happened to sell during the period of insider manipulation. This is clearly a case of
using private compensation for a penal purpose and is a more extreme example of
arbitrariness than that which is the result of the narrow interpretation of § 11 in the
principal case. Indeed, in the principal case, the plaintiff is denied recovery although
it has suffered a loss attributable to the alleged misrepresentations of the defendant
whereas recovery in Texas Gulf would result in a windfall for the compensated parties.
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cussed above, that Congress intended the provisions to serve as a
deterrent.
The fact that liability may exist under section 11 without regard
to whether the issuer acted in bad faith is an additional argument
for limiting the scope of that section. In the principal case, for example, to hold that the issuing corporation is liable, for unintentional misrepresentations, to each of the holders of the more than
16,000,000 outstanding shares of the defendant's common stock is
to extract a rather large price for mere negligence. But, this would,
in fact, be the logical result of expanding section 11 to admit the
plaintiff's claim. The 1933 Act should not be interpreted to allow
such a devastating result since its purpose was not simply to protect
the purchaser of securities, but to do so "with the least possible interference to honest business."13 There has been only a handful of
suits brought under section 11,14 and yet it has been established that
the act has produced a considerably high quality of disclosure; 15
arguably this indicates that unlimited liability is not necessary for
section 11 to be an effective sanction.
Furthermore, the language of other portions of the 1933 Act
supports a restrictive reading of section 11. For example, section
6(a), which stipulates which signatures are to appear on the registration statement (and upon which signatures section 11 liability
may be predicated), provides that the registration statement shall
be effective only as to the specific issue of securities which it purports
to cover. 16 Although this requirement is primarily designed to assure
that new and separate statements will be filed for later issues, and
13. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933).
14. See generally 3 Loss 1683-92, for an extensive compilation of suits brought
under the 1933 Act and an analysis of factors which account for the scarcity of adjudicated claims and recoveries. It should be noted, however, that one reason for the
scarcity of § 11 litigation would seem to be the likelihood of out-of-court settlement
where a § 11 claim appears to be substantively well-founded, since the virtually strict
liability of the offending issuer tends to discourage the contesting of such an accusation.
15. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 1355:
In actual experience however, instances of liability have been remarkably few;
instead, the liability provisions have had the in terrorem effect of creating an
extraordinarily high sense of care and responsibility in the preparation of registration statements.
16. 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1964), provides, subsequent to setting forth
the procedure for filing a registration statement, that "a registration statement shall be
deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered."
Section 4(3)(A), 78 Stat. 580 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(A) (1964), is only consistent
with the restricting of § ll(a) to registered shares. It forces a dealer to differentiate
between shares newly issued and shares outstanding by requiring him to deliver a
prospectus as part of any open market transaction in new shares during a 40-day
period subsequent to their initial public offering.
Rule 413, 17 C.F.R. § 230.413 (1964), provides that:
the registration of additional securities of the same class as other securities for
which a registration statement is already in effect shall be effected through a
separate registration statement relating to the additional securities.
To the same effect, see Rule 416, 17 C.F.R. § 230.416 (1964).
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although it does not expressly purport to limit liability for a single
misleading statement, it is difficult to reconcile this provision with
the theory that the registration of a single issue may be the basis of
liability for losses incurred on an entire class of outstanding securities.
Finally, judicial precedent offers an additional, although somewhat weaker, source of authority for the court's holding in the principal case. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co. 17 is the only prior case
which makes specific mention of the class of plaintiffs entitled to
recover under section 11.18 In that case, holders of common stock
(stock not converted from preferred) brought an action alleging a
section 11 violation. The basis of their suit was a misleading registration statement which covered an issue of preferred stock and the
common stock to which it was convertible. The section 11 claim was
abandoned before adjudication; nonetheless, on appeal, the Second
Circuit said:
A suit under § 11 of the 1933 Act requires no proof of fraud or
deceit, and such a suit may be maintained only by one who comes
within a narrow class of persons, i.e. those who purchase securities
that are the direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement
(here the purchasers of preferred stock).19
The validity of this statement has gone unchallenged, but it must
be recognized that it is mere dicta.
Although there is little doubt that the court reached the proper
result in the principal case, its restrictive construction of section 11
does raise some tangential questions with respect to the effectiveness
and integrated application of the scheme of civil remedies created
by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Recently, concern has been engendered
by the general judicial liberality in implying remedies to supplement
17. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), reversing on other grounds 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
18. See also Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Rudnick v.
Franchard Corp., 237 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
19. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951) (Emphasis
added.) However, the issue of the scope of the class of plaintiffs to be compensated
under § 11 was in no way before the Fischman court. Its holding, in fact, did no more
than imply a remedy for the plaintiffs under § IO(b) of the 1934 Act; and the
language concerning § 11 's scope should be read as an effort to strengthen, by showing
a lack of alternative remedies, their ultimate conclusion that a § IO(b) recovery was
necessary and proper.
Two cases have purported to base holdings on the Fischman case, but neither are
on point factually. The Rudnick case, supra note 18, was a summary dismissal of a
§ 11 suit against an underwriter of a first issue of stock only, where plaintiff had
purchased stock which was the subject of a second issue. The holding was seemingly
based on a failure to show reliance where intervening financial information is available. The Barnes case, supra note 18, was a judicial approval of a stipulation of consent and agreement settlement of a § 11 suit. An objection by an outstanding shareholder to the terms of the settlement which limited recovery to those who had acquired
shares identifiable to the registered issue was dismissed solely on the basis of the
Fischman dicta.
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those which are expressly provided.2° Consequently, the question
arises as to the propriety of implying a remedy under other sections
of the Securities Acts for a plaintiff who is properly denied relief
under section 11.21 It can be forcefully argued that, since section 11
expressly deals with registration misstatement situations and is the
broadest provision for recovery in this area,22 a plaintiff who fails
to come under its protection was not intended to have another remedy and none should be implied in his behalf. The breadth of the
provision is evidenced by the fact that section 11 does not require
elements of proof or relationships between the litigants which are
necessary under other provisions relied upon by the plaintiff. For
example, under the 1933 Act, section 12(1) imposes civil liability
only upon those who have sold unregistered securities in violation
of section 5,23 and section 12(2), which imposes liability on those
selling securities (regardless of whether they are required to be
registered) by means of a prospectus or oral communication containing an untruth or omission of material fact, contains a privity requirement. 24 Moreover, under the 1934 Act, 25 section 9(e) recovery
20. A discussion of the remedies implied from § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q{a) (1964), under the 1933 Act and § IO(b), 48 Stat. 891
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), as implemented by Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5
(1964), is not intended to extend beyond the noting of their existence and the fact
that the principal case discusses rule lOb-5 as the basis of a possible remedy for the
present plaintiff. See notes 28 &: 32 infra and accompanying text.
21. Cf. note 4 supra, citing other sections of the Securities Acts which have been
pleaded in the present case.
22. One of the purposes of the civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act was to
broaden the action of common law deceit. Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818, 819 (3d
Cir. 1941). For an early analysis of the specific ways in which § 11 is an improvement
over common law recovery, see Note, 38 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1103 (1940). See generally 3
Loss 1682-92, 1721-42. Liability under § 11 is imposed jointly and severally upon
different classes of defendants responsible in various ways for the truth of the
registration statement. As to the issuer of the securities, liability is virtually absolute
if the statement is shown to contain a material misstatement or omission; neither
privity, reliance, nor scienter is a requisite element of the plaintiff's case. Section ll(a)
provides that suit may be brought against:
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; (2) every person who was
a director of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in, the issuer
at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to
which his liability is asserted; (3) every person who, with his consent, is named
in the registration statement as being or about to become a director, person per•
forming similar functions, or partner; (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser,
or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who
has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation
which is used in connection with the registation statement, with respect to the
statement in such registration statement, report or valuation, which purports to
have been prepared or certified by him; (5) every underwriter with respect to such
security.
23. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964).
24. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964). This section contem•
plates only a suit by a buyer against the immediate seller, typically the dealer who
made the sale. But "controlling persons" under § 15 may possibly also be held liable.
However, such suit would, practically speaking, also require proof of scienter. See
generally 3 Loss 1699-1721.
25. Cf. note 6 supra.
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is predicated upon proof of a willful misstatement and proof that
such misstatement actually caused the securities to drop in value,26
while section 18(a) requires, in addition, proof that the plaintiff relied upon the misstatement.27 Since these requirements of willfulness,
causation, and reliance impose an almost impossible burden of proof
on any plaintiff, it is not surprising to find a dearth of litigation
under these latter two sections. This is not to suggest that, because
neither the 1933 nor the 1934 Act provides a substitute remedy in
cases where section 11 is not applicable, the court in the principal
case should have construed that section so as to permit plaintiff
to recover. Nor should it move the court to imply a substitute remedy.
However, the fact is that other courts have already significantly
expanded civil remedies for investment injuries beyond the restricted
rights of action expressly provided by Congress, by implying a right
of action for both injured purchasers and sellers of securities under
section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act. 28 The rule simply declares "unlawful" any fraudulent scheme or misrepresentation effec•
tuated through interstate commerce.29 The implied right of action
under the rule has been held to be concurrent with the express provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,30 but is not subject to their proce26. 48 Stat. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964). This section deals with specific
prohibitions against manipulation of prices of securities registered on a national
securities exchange, and the liability runs in favor of anyone who has purchased or
sold a security at a price affected by the prohibited acts or transactions. See generally
3 Loss 1747-51.
27. 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964). This section imposes
liability for filing any false or misleading statement, report, or document pursuant
to the provisions of the Act. See generally 3 Loss 1751-54.
28. See note 20 supra. Among the many excellent discussions and analyses of Rule
10b-5's impact on securities regulation and civil liability are: Klein, The Extension of a
Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule I0b-5, 20 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 81 (1965); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule I0b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DE PAULL. REv. 71 (1962).
The classic analysis of the many anomalies presented by the judicial implication
of remedies which would not otherwise exist under the scheme of federal securities
regulation is by Professor Loss, 3 Loss 1778-97.
29. The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
30. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), was the landmark
decision giving the buyer a remedy under rule l0b-5. That case held that it was
necessary to allege fraud in addition to the material misstatement which is the basis
of a § 11 action. However, later cases have considerably undermined the concept of
fraud, bringing it closer to the language of clause (2) of the rule, note 29 supra. It
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dural and substantive restrictions. 31 Consistent with the recent judicial trend, the court in the principal case indicated that the misstatements and omissions in the registration statement filed by defendants might well constitute the quasi-fraud required for recovery
under rule IOb-5.32 Whether plaintiff may ultimately recover on the
basis of this implied right of action is not known at the present time,
and no attempt to predict the matters of proof that might be required
of it or the extent of its possible recovery thereunder will be undershould be noted that his language bears a striking resemblance to that which describes
actionable conduct under § ll(a). See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers
Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 23 (W.D. Ky. 1960), which states:
A plaintiff purchaser need only prove that a statement in a prospectus or oral
communication is in fact false or is a misleading omission and that he did not
know of such untruth or omission.
Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1070 (1965), examines the holding of Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964), as representative of a growing number
of decisions permitting a buyer's suit under rule lOb-5, including suit for alleged misstatements and omissions under clause (2) of the rule, note 29 supra.
31. See note 10 supra, setting forth the strict requirements of the statute of linlitations and the undertaking for costs under § 11. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th
Cir. 1961), for an excellent discussion of the unavoidable clash between the various
restrictions which are placed on the remedies expressly created by Congress and the
negation of these restrictions by a remedy implied under rule lOb-5.
Section 11 has previously been circumvented by the lOb-5 route to the extent that
the statute of limitations requirement has been negated by a proceeding under rule
!Ob-5 which is controlled by the typically longer state statute of limitations. Fischman
v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Indeed this is the anomaly of the
implied right of recovery for the injured buyer under the rule, i.e., when conduct
which is actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act becomes actionable under rule lOb-5,
there is a circumvention of the restrictive conditions under which the buyer's suit was
intended to be conducted. Sinlilarly, the rule undermines the same restrictions which
are also incident to § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Trussel v. United Undenvriters, Ltd.,
supra note 30, is a good recent example of the trend toward accepting the inherent
anomalies involved in applying rule !Ob-5 to conduct otherwise actionable under the
more restrictive provisions of the 1933 Act.
Since the decision in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., supra, numerous other cases
have recognized the right of a "defrauded" buyer to sue under rule 10b·5 free of the
restrictions imposed by the 1933 Act. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312
F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Matheson v.
Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Ellis v. Carter, supra; Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers
Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960); Greenwich Sav. Bank v. Shields, 131 F.
Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
32. But terms such as "fraud" and "deceit" appearing in the Investment Advisor's
Act of 1940 have been construed by the Supreme Court in accordance with the
legislative purpose which was to "substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor . . . ." S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) •... The Court made it clear, in reversing an en bane
decision of this Circuit, that the underlying legislative purpose was equally
applicable to the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, . . . and that the term "fraud"
~hould not be construed in the early common law technical sense. Rather the
tendency of later cases ... was to merge the "proscription against non-disclosure
into the general proscription against fraud, treating the former, in effect, as one
variety of the latter."
The exhibits introduced on this motion seem to lend some support to the plaintiff's
allegation of nondisclosure or suppression of information material to an evaluation.
Principal case at 882.
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taken.33 However, the court, in summarizing its analysis of matters
which were not before it for adjudication, indicated its position on
the plaintiff's ultimate chance of success as follows:
Although Section 11 would be the simplest to satisfy it hardly follows
that plaintiff will be denied an effective remedy by being precluded
from proceeding on Count One [the Section 11 claim], only, of its
complaint.34

The anomaly of the court's strictly adhering to congressional intent
in considering and rejecting the section 11 claim while simultaneously suggesting the strong possibility of success on a judicially
created and expanded remedy without regard to congressional intent
may presage an expansion of rule I0b-5 which would significantly
undermine the rationale on which the actual holding of the present
case is based. Should plaintiff ultimately recover under rule I 0b-5
to an extent approximating that which he unavailingly claimed
under section 11, a precedent would be established for future judicial
circumvention of section 11. Moreover, as mentioned above, the
resulting broad liability would not be subject to the procedural safeguards which surround section 11 causes of action.35
Thus, the narrow construction which was placed upon section 11
by the court in the principal case may, ironically, provide the impetus for judicial extension of rule 10b-5 so as to impose liability as
severe as that which was rejected in the first instance. Section 11
would remain the most effective source of recovery in those situations
to which it clearly applies-misstatements in registered issues-but
the expansion of the application of rule I 0b-5 into the area distinctively defined both by the scope and the restrictions of section 11
would seem to render those restrictions meaningless and, further,
to call into question the integrity of the federal securities regulatory
scheme.
33. See Klein, supra note 28, at 99-108, discussing the still unsettled questions as to
what elements of proof are required in a buyer's action under rule IOb-5. A recovery
would seem to be possible without proof of privity, reliance, or scicnter. Klein states
that in the light of the Supreme Court's apparent approval of the judicial expansion
of rule IOb-5 in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the
anomalies associated with the rule seem destined to persist absent a comprehensive
reappraisal by Congress, and that it is entirely possible that,
given a liberal construction, Rule l0b-5 would be broad enough to encompass
every type of violation presently cognizable under the e.xprcss provisions of the
two acts, while at the same time it would avoid the built-in restrictions and
limitations contained in those provisions. Thus, for example, by the simple process
of "characterization," a false or misleading registration statement, actionable under
section 11 of the Securities Act, might be held to constitute a "scheme, or artifice
to defraud" or an "untrue statement of a material fact" within Rule IOb-5.
34. Principal case at 883.
35. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.

